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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING POLITICAL
ARTICLE

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING POLITICAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE US SUPREME COURT'S
APPROACH TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION
Gerald N Rosenberg*

ABSTRACT

This article examines the evolving jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court’s
decisions on the constitutionality of affirmative action, with specific focus on
education. Traversing the Court’s affirmative action decisions from the
1970s to 2013, the author argues that the best, and possibly only, way to
understand the evolution of this politically contentious doctrine is to focus
on politics. This requires paying attention to political commitments of the
justices, the role of interest groups, the voter alignments of the Democratic
and Republican parties, and white elite and public opinion. The author uses
leading social science approaches to present three models of judicial
decision-making: the attitudinal model, the strategic actor model, and the
institutional/public opinion model. The article underlines the need to locate
the Court within the political and cultural context in which it operates.
I. INTRODUCTION

In this article, I examine the evolving jurisprudence of the US Supreme
Court's decisions on the constitutionality of affirmative action with specific
focus on education. Starting with the Bakke decision in 19781 and
continuing through the University of Michigan cases in 2003, 2 Parents
Involved in 20073 and Fisher in 2013,4 the Supreme Court has applied
different constitutional standards with different results. I will argue that
the best, if not the only, way to understand this evolving doctrine is to focus
on the political commitments of the justices, the role of interest groups,
the voter alignments of the Democratic and Republican parties and
white elite and public opinion, more generally. I will argue that the text of
the Constitution itself is of little use in understanding how it will be
interpreted and how that interpretation will change.

•
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4
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The contribution of the paper is manifold. First, by way of background, it
presents and discusses many of the leading cases interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14 th Amendment of the US Constitution. It then
turns, secondly, to the affirmative action decisions of the US Supreme Court,
starting in the 1970s and continuing through 2013. Third, it summarises
and applies the leading social science approaches to undemanding judicial
decision-making, including the attitudinal model, the strategic actor model,
and the institutional/public opinion model. Finally, it makes what, I believe,
is a powerful case that, in order to understand the jurisprudence of the US
Supreme Court in politically contentious issues, scholars must take politics
into account.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND 19Ta CENTURY CASES

The starting point for any discussion of affirmative action is the 14th
Amendment to the US Constitution. The so-called Equal Protection Clause
of Section I states, 'no state shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws'. Enacted in 1868 as part of the post-Civil
War attempt to protect the newly freed slaves, these sixteen words have
been the focus of intense scrutiny. What does it mean to deny a person the
'equal protection of the laws'? Surely, it doesn't mean that all people need to
be treated identically. Laws make distinctions between people all the time.
Children are treated differently than adults, wealthy people pay taxes at
higher rates than the poor, and some businesses are regulated in ways that
others are not. The Equal Protection Clause was not intended to make such
distinctions unconstitutional.
In order to understand how the Supreme Court has approached the question
of the constitutionality of affirmative action, it is necessary to understand
its basic approach to race-based discrimination and the Equal Protection
Clause. In 1873, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,5 the US Supreme Court
first turned its attention to the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Discussing the adoption of the 13th Amendment which prohibited slavery,
the 14th Amendment, and the 15th Amendment which guaranteed newly free
(male) slaves the right to vote, the Court noted that they were 'events almost
too recent to be called history' 6 which were 'fresh within the memory of us
all'. 7 The Amendments had a 'unity of purpose' 8 to protect the newly freed
slaves: 'the one pervading purpose found in them all... [is] the freedom of
5
6
7
8

(1872) 83 us 36.
ibid 71.
ibid68.
ibid67.
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the slave race' .9 The 'obvious purpose' of the 13 th Amendment, the Court
wrote, was to 'forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery'. 10 But,
on its own, it wasn't enough to protect their rights: 'the condition of the
slave race would, without further protection of the Federal government, be
almost as bad as it was before.' 11 The Court continued, ' ...something more
was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate
race who had suffered so much.' 12 Thus, the 14th Amendment was ratified.
But, it, too, was 'inadequate for the protection of life, liberty, and property,
without which freedom to the slave was no boon.' 13 So, the 15 th Amendment
was added to the US Constitution. Thus, the clear understanding of these
Civil War Amendments, including the 14th Amendment, was that they were
intended to help and protect African-Americans.
Constitutional provisions, even majestic ones, don't exist in a vacuum. They
are interpreted, and can only be interpreted, by people living in a particular
place and time. Although the Civil War Amendments were ratified by twothirds majorities in each House of Congress and by three-fourths of the
State legislatures, as required by Article V of the US Constitution,14 white
Americans were at best ambivalent about and, at worst, hostile to guaranteeing
equal rights to African-Americans. For example, when the US Congress
was debating what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875 guaranteeing equal
treatment in public places, the Chicago Tribune wrote, '[is] it not time for
the colored race to stop playing baby?ns Overcoming opposition, Congress
passed the Act. Section 1 held that:
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition
of servitude.16

9
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In the Civil Rights Cases of 188317 the Court heard a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act. The case brought together challenges to the
law from the five states of California, Kansas, Missouri, New York, and
Tennessee. In each of these states, African-Americans had been denied
entrance to places covered under the Act, and they sued to have the Act
enforced. The geographic range of the states, including the stalwart
Union States of New York and California, is revealing of widespread white
antipathy to guaranteeing African-Americans equal rights. For many white
Americans, reintegrating white southerners back into the United States was
the paramount goal. Former US President Rutherford Hayes wrote to US
Supreme Court Chief Justice Waite in July 1882, stressing the importance of
maintaining the friendship of white Southerners: 'With that sentiment right,
our cause will advance, with that sentiment wrong, all our efforts will fail.'
The Chief Justice responded two days later: 'I agree with you entirely as to
the necessity of keeping public sentiment at the South in our favor.' 18 Thus.
it should be no surprise that in its decision the Supreme Court, by a vote
of 8-1, interpreted the Act narrowly so as not to apply to privately owned
establishments. Since virtually all 'inns, public conveyances ... theaters,
and other places of public amusement' were privately owned, this decision
rendered the Act insignificant. Justice Bradley, writing for the 8-Justice
majority, reflected the lack of support among white Americans for protecting
the rights of African-Americans:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and, by the aid of beneficent
legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state,
there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he
takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite
of the laws .... 19
The decision in the Civil Rights Cases reflected the lack of support of the
federal government, and white America, for protecting the rights of AfricanAmericans. With white majorities uninterested in protecting their rights,
and the US federal government unwilling to act, states were in effect free
to discriminate on the basis of race. While racial discrimination existed
everywhere in the US, it was particularly enforced in the South. In the
southern states of the Civil War Confederacy, racial apartheid systems were
created, backed by the authority of the state and the force of white vigilante

17
18
19

(1883) 109 U.S. 3.
As quoted in Friedman (n 15) 149.
n 17, 25.
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violence. The distinguished US historian, C Vann Woodward, describes
the situation facing African-Americans in the late 19th century in poignant
language:
Blacks watched with despair while the foundations for the Jim Crow
[apartheid] system were laid and the walls of segregation mounted
around them. Their disenchantment with the hopes based on the
Civil War amendments and the Reconstruction laws was nearly
complete by 1890. The American commitment to equality, solemnly
attested by three amendments to the Constitution and elaborate civil
rights acts, was virtually repudiated. What had started as a retreat
in 1877, when the last Federal troops were pulled out of the South,
had turned into a rout. Northern radicals and liberals had abandoned
the cause; the courts had rendered the Constitution helpless; the
Republican Party had forsaken the cause it had sponsored. A tide of
racism was mounting in the country unopposed. Blacks held no less
than five national conventions in 1890 to consider their plight, but
all they could do was to pass resolutions of protest and confess their
helplessness. 20
There is no better judicial example of this abandonment of protecting the
rights of African-Americans than the US Supreme Court decision in Plessy
v Ferguson in 1896. 21 In the years 1887-1891, eight southern states passed
laws requiring railroads to segregate passengers on account of race. The
Louisiana statute of 1890 required railroads to provide 'equal, but separate'
accommodation for blacks and whites. 22 For the most part, the railroads
complied with the separate requirement of the law but not the equal one.
Homer Plessy, an African-American, was arrested for violating the Act.
He challenged the constitutionality of the law under both the 13 th and 14th
Amendments to the US Constitution. In contrast to the holding of the Civil
Rights Cases, the denial of equal treatment by the railroads was pursuant to
state law. Their actions were not those of private individuals who the Court
had held were beyond the reach of the federal government. Rather, they
were actions required by state law. This should have made it easy for the US
Supreme Court to follow the precedent it set in the Civil Rights Cases and
invalidate this and other 'separate, but equal' laws.

20
21
22
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Constitution of 1896 was not the Constitution of 1868 when the 14th
Amendment was adopted. The words hadn't changed, but both white
public and elite opinion had changed. Thus, the Court found the case easy.
With only one dissenting Justice, the Court held the Louisiana stature
constitutional. Writing for the Court, Justice Brown drew a new distinction,
not between private and state action as in the Civil Rights Cases, but between
social and political equality. Although the 'object of the [14 th] Amendment
was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law,' Justice Brown wrote, 'in the nature of things, it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality... .'23 In deciding whether legislation
violates the requirements of the 14th Amendment, the Court held that 'there
must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature.' The state,
the Court held, 'is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people ....'24 In response to Plessy's argument
that, as the Court put it, 'the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority', the Court disingenuously
responded, '[i]f this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.' 25
In the discussion above, I suggested that the Court was following white elite
and public opinion. How often does the Court decide cases, more or less, in
keeping with public opinion? In his classic historical study of the behaviour
of the US Supreme Court, Robert G Mccloskey argued that the US Supreme
Court 'learned to be a political institution and to behave accordingly.' 26 What
he meant by this was that lacking enforcement powers, the Court learned
that to be effective it pretty much had to keep its decisions in line with public
opinion. At bottom, the Court realised the truth of what Alexander Hamilton
wrote in Federalist #78 long ago: that it lacks power. The Court, Hamilton
wrote, has 'no influence over either the sword or the purse ... and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy
of its judgments'.27 Thus, Mccloskey wrote, '[J]udicial ideas of the good
society can never be too far removed from the popular ideas.' 28 Throughout
23
24
25

26
27
28

ibid 544.
ibid sso.
ibid 552. In his justifiably famous solo dissent, the former slave owner Justice Harlan wrote, the
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261.
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its history, he found that the 'Court has seldom lagged far behind or forged
far ahead of America,' 29 and 'seldom strayed very far from the mainstreams
of American life.' 30 So, as the views of the American public shifted, so did
the opinions of the Court. For Mccloskey, 'the Court's whole history can be
viewed as a constant or, at least, repeated readjustment of role to suit the
circumstances of each succeeding judicial era.' 31
A few years earlier, Robert Dahl published his famous article, 'DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker'. 32
Examining the history of the Supreme Court, Dahl concluded that '[b]y
itself the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy.33
This was largely because of the appointment process. Dahl calculated
the average number of months between appointments, finding it to be 22
months. 34 Thus, historically, on average, a one-term President would likely
have two appointments, and a two-term President would likely have four.
Unless presidents choose poorly, the new Justices would likely reflect the
policy views of the President and the political coalition that elected him.
This meant, Dahl concluded, that 'the policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the US'. 35
In 2009, law professors Lucas A Powe, Jr, and Barry Friedman published
books that amplified and enlarged these arguments. Powe investigated the
interests and demands of political elites and how the Court works with
them to further their interests. His 'dominant theme' was that the 'Court is
a majoritarian institution' .36 As Powe understands the role of the Court, it is
to 'harmonize the Constitution with the demands of majoritarian politics'. 37
Friedman focused not on elites but on public opinion. His aim was to provide
a 'chronicle of the relationship between the popular will and the Supreme
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Court as it unfolded over two-hundred-plus years of American history'. 38
In doing so, he concludes that what 'history shows is assuredly not that
Supreme Court decisions always are in line with popular opinion, but rather
that they come into line with one another over time'. 39
Mccloskey, Dahl, Powe and Friedman understand the Court as a political
institution constrained by forces and actors in addition to the law. Their
overall explanation for the Court's opinions seems to describe well the
decisions I have discussed so far. When elite or white public opinion
supported protecting the rights of African-Americans, the Court upheld laws
that did that and struck down laws that didn't. Cases like the Slaughterhouse
Cases illustrate this claim. However, when elite or white opinion was hostile
to African-Americans, so was the Court. This is seen in the Civil Rights Cases
and Plessy. And, as shall be explained, when the white public and elites were
torn, so was the Court (Bakke) . This institutional/public opinion model
appears to have explanatory power.
III. 20TH CENTURY CASES

Brown v Board ofEducation of Topeka, Kansas
In 1954, the US Supreme Court issued a landmark decision that
fundamentally changed constitutional interpretation. At issue was whether
state laws that required racial segregation in public schools denied AfricanAmerican children the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
14th Amendment. At the time of the decision, the eleven states of the Civil
War Confederacy enforced such laws, as did the six states that bordered the
region and Washington, DC, the nation's capital. In addition, four other states
allowed local racial segregation. All of these jurisdictions operated racially
segregated schools under the 'Separate-but-Equal' doctrine upheld in
Plessy. The African-American plaintiffs argued that while the schools were
racially segregated, they were hardly equal. More importantly, they argued
that separating African-Americans from whites, regardless of whether the
school facilities were equal, denied African-Americans the equal protection
of the laws.

A unanimous Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Earl Warren wrote, 'to separate them [African-American school children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
38
39

Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and
Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2009) 4.
ibid 382.
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affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone'.40 Thus, the
Court concluded, ' .. .in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal'.41 In effectively reversing the holding of Plessy v Ferguson, the
Court overturned more than half a century of constitutional interpretation.
What led the Supreme Court to change its interpretation of tile Equal
Protection Clause? Its words had not changed, nor had other relevant
provisions of the Constitution. What had changed was elite white opinion
and, to some extent, white public opinion. 42 The US government urged the
Court to find racial segregation in schools unconstitutional. In particular,
the US Department of State, seeing the world through a Cold War lens,
argued that racial segregation made the US look bad in its ideological battle
with the Soviet Union.43 While the justices struggled with how to decide
the case, 44 in the end their decision was unanimous. And, in recent decades,
Brown has been praised across the political spectrum. No serious politician,
judge, or lawyer can reject Brown and expect to be taken seriously. Former
law professor and later Reagan-appointed federal court of appeals Judge J
Harvie Wilkinson put it this way in 1979: 'Brown may be the most important
political, social, and legal event in America's twentieth-century history'. 45
Fifteen years later, law professor Michael Klarman went even further, writing
that 'constitutional lawyers and historians generally deem Brown v. Board of
Education to be the most important United States Supreme Court decision
40

41

42

43

44
45
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347 US 483, 494. Although this language repudiated Justice Brown's statement in Plessy that
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of the Twentieth Century and, possibly, of all time'.46 With this background,
I turn now to consideration of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE EARLY YEARS

Affirmative action in education in the United States involves the question of
whether background attributes such as race, gender, and ethnic origin can be
taken into account along with academic credentials in admissions decisions.
Among qualified applicants, is it an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection for a university to give preference to applicants from minority
groups who have suffered, and may continue to suffer, from discrimination?
US society and the Supreme Court have been struggling with this question
since the 1970s.
In the period 1941-1963, US presidents issued twelve Executive Orders
dealing with nondiscrimination and/or equal opportunity within the
federal government. For example, in June 1941, President Roosevelt issued
Executive Order 8802, requiring that 'there shall be no discrimination in the
employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race,
creed, color, or national origin ....' 47 Then, in 1964, the US Congress passed,
and President Johnson signed into law, the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VII
of the Act made it unlawful for any employer to discriminate against 'any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....' 48 The
clear aim of Title VII was to stop discrimination against people of colour.
For many proponents of equality, Title VII, although important, was not
enough to counter the negative effects of past discrimination and the
ongoing effects of current discrimination. In June 1965, President Johnson
gave the commencement address at Howard University, the historically
black university in Washington, DC, chartered by the US Congress in 1867.
In his speech, he stressed the need to do more than guarantee freedom from
discrimination:
But freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of
centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do
as you desire, and choose the leaders you please.... You do not take a
person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him,
bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, 'you are free to
46
47
48

Michael J Klarman, 'How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis' (1994) 81
Journal Of American History.
Executive Order 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (27 June 1941) <https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ history/35th/
the law/ eo-8802.html>
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 USC § 2000e etseq (1964).
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compete with all the others', and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair.... This is the next and the more profound stage of the
battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We
seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right
and a theory, but equality as a fact and equality as a result.49
As head of the Executive Branch, President Johnson used his position to
implement his vision of nondiscrimination. In September 1965, he issued
Executive Order 1124650 requiring companies receiving contracts from the
federal government to take affirmative action to assure non-discrimination.
And, in 1969, the Department of Labor enforced, in effect, a hiring quota
under EO 11246. This so-called 'Philadelphia Plan' was upheld by the US
Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in 1971. 51
President Johnson's image of racial minorities, particularly AfricanAmericans, as hobbled by centuries of discrimination was powerful.
Universities in the US, especially me most prestigious ones, historically have
been virtually all white with only a handful of minority students. In terms
of elementary and secondary education, African-Americans lagged behind
white Americans in school completion rates, academic records and test
scores. When President Johnson delivered his Howard University speech,
many African-Americans still attended schools that were 100% AfricanAmerican, were under-funded, lacked adequate facilities and resources, and
often had poorly trained teachers. In response to the passage of Tide VII
as well as the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, many universities began
to make efforts to diversify their student bodies. One such was the medical
school of the University of California at Davis.
The medical school at the University of California at Davis was founded
in 1968. Its first class of fifty students had neither African-Americans, nor
Mexican-American members. 52 Starting in the early 1970s, the faculty
adopted a 'special admissions program to increase the representation of
"disadvantaged" students in each Medical School class. 53 In essence, 16 of
the now 100 places in the entering class were reserved for racial and ethnic
minorities. From 1971 to 1974, the special admission programme resulted in
49

50
51
52
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the admission of 21 black students and 30 Mexican-American students, while
over the same period, only I African-American and 6 Mexican-Americans
were admitted under the regular admissions programme. 54
Allan Bakke was a white male who applied to, and was rejected by, the
Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. 'In both years, applicants were
admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT
scores and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.'55 After his
second rejection, Bakke brought suit in California courts, arguing that
he was denied admission on the basis of race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 56 The trial court agreed, finding
that the special admission programme was a racial quota that violated the
California and US Constitutions and federal law. The court held that the
University could not take race into account in making admissions decisions. 57
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the Davis programme
denied Allan Bakke the equal protection of the laws because it was not the
least intrusive means of achieving the admittedly compelling state interest
of having more doctors from minority groups. The decision was appealed to
the US Supreme Court.
In deciding whether a plaintiff has been denied equal protection, the US
Supreme Court has developed three standards. The first, and most common,
is the rational relations test. This test holds that there is no denial of
equal protection if government action is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. Application of the rational relations test inevitably
results in government action being upheld.
As early as 1938, the Court worried that rational relation was too lax a
standard for evaluating govern mental action alleged to deny minorities
the equal protection of the law. In the most famous footnote in Supreme
Court history, footnote four of US v Carolene Products Co., 58 Justice Stone
wondered:
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation

54
55

56
57
58

ibid 275.
ibid 277. The 'MCAT' (Medical College Admission Test) was a test required of all medical school
applicants. The 'benchmark' score was a compilation of ratings given to each applicant by the
admissions committee. Applicants with benchmark scores above a designated level were offered
admission.
Bakke also claimed that his rejection violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Section 1 of
the California Constitution.
Regents of the University of California (n 1) 279.
(1938) 304 us 144.
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of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry. 59
Six years later, Justice Black answered Justice Stone's query in the affirmative,
writing for the Court that 'all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect ... [and] courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny'.60 As this strict scrutiny standard developed,
when government action is challenged as denying a racial minority the equal
protection of the laws, a court asks whether the legislation is necessary to
further a compelling governmental purpose or, sometimes, whether it is
the least intrusive means possible for achieving that purpose or is narrowly
tailored. Traditionally, with the exception of the Korematsu opinion which
announced the strict scrutiny test, no legislation to which the standard was
applied was upheld. It used to be said that the standard was strict in theory
but fatal in fact. As we shall see, this has changed.
Finally, as the women's movement challenged gender discrimination in the
United States, the Court was faced with the question of which standard to
apply to gender discrimination claims. After struggling with the issue for
several years, the Court adopted a third standard, the so-called intermediate
standard of review. 61 When a law classifying people on the basis of gender is
challenged as denying equal protection, the Court asks whether the law is
substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.
The Bakke case presented the question of which standard the Court should
apply to evaluate the constitutionality of affirmative action. If it were to apply
rational relation, the Davis programme would be upheld. On the other hand,
if it decided the applicable standard was strict scrutiny, as the California
Supreme Court thought it was, the affirmative action programme would be
struck down. And, there was the possibility of applying the intermediate
level scrutiny test developed in gender discrimination cases.
The fact that made the choice of standard particularly challenging was that
the person alleging a denial of equal protection, Allan Bakke, was a white
man, not a racial minority! In formulating and applying the strict scrutiny
standard, the Court had focused on assessing claims that the challenged laws
denied racial minorities the equal protection of the laws. In developing the
59
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intermediate scrutiny standard, the Court was focused on discrimination
against women. 62 But, in this case, as in all affirmative action cases, race or
gender is taken into account to help, not burden, racial minorities and women.
Should that matter? Should whites alleging a denial of equal protection on
the basis of race be treated the same as, or differently than, racial minorities
alleging racial discrimination? Was the 14th Amendment adopted to protect
the rights of African-Americans and other racial minorities or was its broad
language applicable to all people regardless of race? These were difficult
issues and the Bakke Court struggled with them.
A few years before Bakke, in 1974, the Court had heard another affirmative
action case, DeFunis v Odegaard.63 The facts of this case were somewhat
similar to those of Bakke. At issue was a preferential admission plan at the
law school of the University of Washington. In 1971, a white male applicant,
Marco DeFunis, Jr., applied for admission and was subsequently rejected.
He alleged that under the preferential admission plan, the law school had
admitted racial minorities with lower LSAT scores64 and grades. He filed
suit, arguing that the preferential admission plan discriminated against him
on account of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
The trial court agreed with DeFunis and ordered him admitted to the law
school. The University of Washington complied with the order but appealed
the case. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington State held the
preferential admissions plan constitutional and reversed the trial court's
decision. DeFunis, by this point in his second year oflaw school, appealed to
the US Supreme Court.
By the time the case reached the US Supreme Court, it was seen as having
national importance. More than two dozen amicus briefs were filed,
representing dozens of organizations.65 The political breakdown of the
amicus briefs was revealing of the difficulty of the issue. It revealed the
fraying of the progressive New Deal political coalition comprised of unions,
civil rights groups and Jewish groups. This coalition had provided the
political support for laws such as Social Security, the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Food Stamps, Medicare and Medicaid. While the overwhelming majority
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of amici argued for the constitutionality of the affirmative action plan, the
largest union in the country, the American Federation of Labor and Congress
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), as well as several Jewish groups,
joined with the conservative business group, the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, to argue in support ofDeFunis.
The US Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case in February 1974.
Two months later, on April 23, 1974, the Court announced its decision. The
Court held:
Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the
end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any
decision this Court might reach on the merits of this litigation, we
conclude that the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of
Art. III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional
issues tendered by the parties.66
The Court punted! It held the case moot. Why, after accepting the case,
hearing oral argument, receiving dozens of amicus briefs, did the Court
make the embarrassing decision to decline to decide the substantive issue?
Making matters worse, when the case was filed, it was no secret that DeFunis
was a student at the University of Washington law school and was on track
to graduate in the spring of 1974. Yet, that didn't prevent the Court from
agreeing to hear the case, even though the Court has control over virtually
all of its docket. The answer is likely that the justices were so splintered in
their views that they preferred to avoid deciding the case.
But, the Court couldn't avoid the issue for long, nor the intense interest
it engendered. In the Bakke case, nearly sixty amici briefs were filed
representing approximately one hundred organisations and individuals,
the largest number of such briefs ever filed in a Supreme Court case to
this point. 67 And this time the Court produced an opinion, albeit a deeply
fractured one. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, four justices held that the
correct constitutional standard to apply to affirmative action plans 'designed
to further remedial purposes' was the intermediate level scrutiny standard. 68
Applying this standard, the four justices upheld the Davis plan. Four other
justices, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, didn't reach the constitutional
issue. They held that the special admissions programme violated Title VI of
66
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the Civil Rights Act of 196469 by 'excluding Bakke from the Medical School
because of his race',7° Thus, there were four votes holding that neither the
Constitution, nor legislation, prohibited a university from taking race into
account in its admission decisions, and that under Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, a university could never take race into account in admissions.
This tie was broken by Justice Powell who agreed, in part, with each of the
two groups. Applying the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Powell rejected
the Davis plan. Its 'fatal flaw', he wrote, was its racial quota, its 'disregard of
individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment'. 71 This meant
there were five justices who held the Davis programme unconstitutional,
albeit for different reasons. However, he did find that the attainment of 'a
diverse student bodym was constitutionally 'compelling in the context of
a university's admissions program.' 73 In order to achieve it, Justice Powell
held that, while a university couldn't set aside a specific number of spots for
racial minorities, it could take race inro account in its admission decisions.
In choosing among qualified candidates, Justice Powell held that 'race or
ethnic background may be deemed a "plus" in a particular applicant's file.' 74
This part of his opinion was joined by the other four justices, meaning
five justices held that universities could take race into account in their
admissions decisions.
The result of the Bakke decision was that, while universities could take race
into account as one factor in admissions, they could not impose racial quotas.
In essence, this allowed universities to continue their affirmative action
programmes. While some critics thought there was no essential difference
between a racial quota and treating race as one factor among many,7 5 the
decision gave a little something to each side. Opponents of affirmative action
could point to the holding that racial quotas denied applicants the equal
protection of the laws, while supporters could reply that it was constitutional
for a university to take race into account.
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Why did the justices adopt this position? Certainly the language of the
Constitution did not compel the result. The best answer, I think, is that the
decision reflected a political compromise between contending forces. The
New Deal coalition was split. There was little public opinion polling on the
issue, but from the scant evidence that was available, the public seemed both
unsure and divided in its views. 76 The brief filed by the US government argued
for the constitutionality of taking race into account but pretty much avoided
the issue of racial quotas, mentioning opposition to it only in passing.77 A
split and unsure society produced a split opinion.
V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER BAKKE

The Bakke decision, as might be expected, did not end the controversy over
affirmative action. Affirmative action programmes had also been adopted
by governments at different levels to increase the number of minorities
receiving government contracts. The city of Richmond, Virginia, adopted
such a plan, giving preference to minority-owned businesses in the awarding
of city contracts. In City of Richmond v JA Croson Co.,78 the Court held that
this programme violated the Equal Protection Clause. In writing for the
Court, Justice O'Connor applied the strict scrutiny standard. However, there
were several concurring opinions, making it somewhat unclear whether the
majority of justices would apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action plans.
The question was settled in Adarand v Pena (1995), 79 another case about
preferences for minority-owned businesses, this time by the federal
government. Writing for herself and four other justices, Justice O'Connor
stated:
we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.
However, Justice O 'Connor made the explicit point that adopting strict
scrutiny didn't automatically mean that all affirmative action plans would be
76
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found unconstitutional. Towards the end of her opinion, she wrote, 'we wish
to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"'. 80
The Adarand case was also notable for the concurring opinion of Justice
Thomas, the only African-American member of the Court. One of the
Court's most conservative members, Justice Thomas equated affirmative
action with segregation and apartheid. 81 He wrote, 'I believe that there is
a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence" ...between laws designed to
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in
order to foster some current notion of equality.' 82 For Justice Thomas,
'government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice
is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In
each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.' 83 In response,
Justice Stevens rejected 'Justice Thomas' extreme proposition-that there
is a moral and constitutional equivalence between an attempt to subjugate
and an attempt to redress the effects of a caste system ....' 84 Acknowledging
that there are 'many responsible arguments' against affirmative action
programmes, Justice Stevens rejected the argument that 'equate[dl the many
well-meaning and intelligent lawmakers and their constituents ...who have
supported affirmative action over the years, to segregationists and bigots.' 85
What led the Supreme Court to adopt the strict scrutiny standard for
evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? One powerful answer
comes from the attitudinal model of judicial decision making.
The attitudinal model of judicial decision-making was created by Political
Scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth in the 1980s. It posits that when
justices are faced with a legal issue, the most important factor leading to their
decision is neither the Constitution, nor the law, nor precedent, nor legal
argument. In fact, it isn't legal at all! The factor is their policy preferences.
According to the attitudinal model, justices chose the outcome they prefer
and then find the appropriate legal arguments to support it. In two books,86
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

ibid 227.
ibid 240.
ibid 240.
ibid 241.
ibid 248.
ibid.
Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge
University Press 1993); Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press 2002). See also, Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth,
'The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of US Supreme Court Justices' (1996) 40 Am J Pol
Sci 971.

83

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING POLITICAL

they make the case that the attitudinal model better explains the outcomes
of Supreme Court cases than does any appeal to the law.
One of the challenges in applying the attitudinal model is to find a measure
of each justice's policy preferences. The measure must be independent of
their votes in cases; otherwise, the logic is circular. A judge might vote in
a consistently liberal or conservative direction across a number of related
cases, not because she is liberal or conservative, but rather because she is
applying a principled jurisprudential approach.
There are two main approaches to discerning a justice's policy preferences.
The first is based on coding newspaper editorials in two generally liberal and
two generally conservative newspapers from a time a justice is nominated by
the President, to the time the Senate votes to confirm the nominee. A score is
then created for each justice, from Oto 1, with 0 being a perfect conservative
and 1 being a perfect liberal. In a 1989 journal article, Political Scientists
Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover employed this methodology to study the
voting records of the seventeen justices nominated between 1954 and 1988,
that is, from the nomination of Early Warren in 1954 through the nomination
of Anthony Kennedy in 1988. 87 They then explored how each justice voted
in cases involving civil liberties, civil rights, criminal procedure, freedom
of speech, due process and privacy. Based on just the scores they developed
from the newspaper editorials, they correctly predicted 80% of the votes!
Excluding Justice Harlan, they correctly predicted 86% of the votes. In other
words, without knowing the facts of a case, the relevant constitutional or
statutory provisions, the related precedents, the briefs or oral arguments-in
fact, without knowing anything about a case other than what area of law
it involved-the attitudinal model correctly predicted close to 90% of the
justices' votes.
As impressive as the results of the Segal-Cover scores are, the methodology is
cumbersome. A second, albeit crude, measure of a justice's policy preferences
is to use the political party of the President who appoints a justice as a proxy.
The idea here is that presidents almost always appoint members of their
own party to the Supreme Court. Further, the intuition is that Democrats
and Republicans have different policy preferences, particularly on issues
such as of civil rights and civil liberties, women's rights, privacy, the rights
of workers, the rights of criminal defendants, environmental protection and
87
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government regulation more generally. At first glance, this measure seems
too crude. Political parties in the US are traditionally seen as being big tents,
covering a wide variety of viewpoints. However true this may be, using the
political party of the President as a proxy for a justice's policy preferences
is a surprisingly powerful predictor of how they vote. This holds true even
at the appellate level where judges are constrained by Supreme Court
precedent. Cass Sunstein and colleagues undertook a major study of nearly
15,000 votes of judges of the US Courts of Appeals across thirteen areas of
law, from 1995 to the early part of the twenty-first century.88 They found
statistically significant differences in the votes of these judges in almost all
the areas they examined, based solely on the political party of the President
who appointed them.
How does the attitudinal model help us to understand theAdarand decision?
Using the party of the appointing President as a proxy for the justices'
policy preferences, overall Republicans, including Republican Presidents,
generally oppose affirmative action, while Democrats, including Democratic
Presidents, generally support it. The five justices in the Adarand majority
who adopted the strict scrutiny standard were appointed by Republican
Presidents Reagan and George HW Bush. In contrast, the two Justices
appointed by a Democratic President, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
dissented. So, only knowing the political party of the appointing President
correctly predicts seven of the nine votes. It does not, however, correctly
predict the dissenting votes of Justices Stevens and Sourer, appointed by
Republican Presidents Ford and George HW Bush, respectively. This is
largely because both justices were more moderate than typical Republican
nominees. President Ford, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, lacking
electoral legitimacy89 and facing a Democrat-controlled Senate, was in a
weak political position. It is no surprise, then, that he nominated a more
moderate person. President Bush was influenced by his White House Chief
of Staff, John Sununu of New Hampshire, who supported David Souter, also
from New Hampshire. President Bush was also hoping to avoid a political
battle with the Democratic-controlled Senate. Again, the fact that Justice
Sourer was more moderate than the typical Republican appointee is no
surprise.
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Returning to affirmative action in education, while most colleges and
universities adopted affirmative action plans, they remained controversial
for some people. For example, the Law School at the University of Texas rook
race into account in its admission procedures. This practice was challenged
by a white woman, Cheryl Hopwood, and three white men who were denied
admission to the law school. They alleged that the law school's use of race
as one factor in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause. In 1996,
the US Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit agreed.90 Addressing the Bakke
decision and the issue of diversity, the court held that 'Justice Powell's view
in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue' in part because 'no other
Justice joined in that part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale'. 91
The court then held that the correct standard to apply to evaluating the
constitutionality of affirmative action was strict scrutiny. Applying that
standard, the court held that 'any consideration of race or ethnicity by
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not
a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 92 In a sweeping
conclusion, the court wrote:
In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School of Law
may not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit
in order to achieve a diverse student body, to combat the perceived
effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the law
school's poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate
any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law
school. 93
On appeal, the US Supreme Court declined to hear the case. The result
was that in the three states over which the US Court of Appeals for the 5th
Circuit exercises jurisdiction, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, affirmative
action was unconstitutional.
Although Texas is a politically conservative state, many people were
troubled by the drop in the enrolment of black and Hispanic students at the
state's flagship campuses, the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A &
M University, in the wake of the Hopwood decision. In response, in 1997,
the Texas legislature passed, and Governor George W Bush signed, a bill
that guaranteed admission to any public university in Texas to any student
90
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who graduated in the top 10 per cent of his or her high school class. Given
the racially segregated nature of many high schools in Texas, it was widely
believed that this 'Top Ten Percent Plan' would increase enrolment of
Hispanic and African-American students in Texas universities. 94
VI. THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES

The Supreme Court returned to the issue of affirmative action in university
admissions in 2003 when it heard two cases challenging affirmative actions
programmes at the University of Michigan. 95 In Gratz v Bollinger, 96 the
Court examined the constitutionality of the affirmative action programme
for admission to the undergraduate programme. In Grutter v Bollinger, 97 the
focus was on the affirmative action plan for admission to the Law School.
The Grutter opinion discussed the issues in more depth.
The facts of Grutter were similar to the facts of other affirmative action cases.
Barbara Grutter, a white applicant from Michigan, was denied admission
to the University of Michigan Law School, one of the highest ranking law
schools in the country. Because the Law School seeks 'a mix of students with
varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each
other;98 it adopted an affirmative action programme. Under that programme,
the law school takes account of 'racial and ethnic diversity [in the admission
process] with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups
which have been historically discriminated ...against'. The law school aims
to enrol a '"critical mass" of [under-represented] minority students' to
'ensur[e] their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the
Law School.'99 Grutter challenged this programme as denying her the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment.
Justice O'Connor, writing for a five-vote majority, held that the appropriate
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the programme was strict
scrutiny. Rejecting the notion that the strict scrutiny standard was 'strict in
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theory, but fatal in fact,' 100 Justice O'Connor asked whether the law school
had a compelling interest in adopting its affirmative action plan. She found
that it did. That compelling interest was diversity: 'we endorse Justice
Powell's view [in Bakke] that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.' 101 This
led to the next question under the strict scrutiny standard: was the law
school's affirmative action programme narrowly tailored to achieve its
goal? Again, the majority held that it was. 'To be narrowly tailored, a raceconscious admissions programme cannot use a quota system.' Instead,
a university may consider race or ethnicity only as a 'plus' in a particular
applicant's file,' without 'insulat[ing] the individual from comparison' with
all other candidates for the available seats. 102 In other words, universities can
'consider race or ethnicity more :flexibly as a "plus" factor in the context of
individualized consideration of each and every applicant.' Justice O'Connor
concluded that this was how the Michigan Law School's affirmative action
programme worked: 'the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law
School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.'103
The result in Gratz was different, as was the University of Michigan's
affirmative action plan for undergraduate admissions. Under that plan,
applicants were scored on a point scale in which an applicant could score a
maximum of 150 points. 104 Applicants from an 'under-represented racial or
ethnic minority group' were automatically given 20 points.105 Applicants who
scored 100 points or higher were admitted. 106 Jennifer Gratz, a white woman
from Michigan who was denied admission, challenged this affirmative action
programme as violating the Constitution by denying her the equal protection
of the laws. The Court agreed. Applying the strict scrutiny standard, Chief
Justice Rehnquist held that the automatic distribution of 20 points, onefifth of the points needed for admission, did not provide the individualised
treatment that the Equal Protection Clause demanded. Thus, the Court
concluded, the affirmative action plan was 'nor narrowly tailored to achieve
the interest in educational diversity that respondents' claim justifies their
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program'.107 Justice Breyer concurred in the judgement but didn't join the
Chief Justice's opinion. 108
How can the opinions in these cases be explained? Looked at from the
vantage point of the institutional model, they reflect the split nature of public
opinion on the issue. According to the Gallup Poll in 2001, 47% of Americans
favoured affirmative action programmes for minorities while 44% opposed
them.109 In 2003, the year of these decisions, 49% ofrespondents supported
such programmes with 43% opposed. 110 By splitting the difference, upholding
the law school's affirmative action plan and striking down the undergraduate
plan, the Court can be seen as giving each side a victory, in effect offering a
political compromise.
The attitudinal model does less well in explaining the results. In Grutter,
it successfully predicts the votes of the four Republican-appointed justices
who dissented, as well as the two Democrat-appointed justices who voted
to uphold the programme. However, they were joined by three-Republican
appointees, Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Souter. Earlier in the article, I
discussed why Justices Stevens and Souter might be expected to be more
moderate on affirmative action than other Republican appointees. The same is
true of Justice O'Connor. When he ran for President, Ronald Reagan pledged
to appoint the first woman to the Supreme Court. When the opportunity
arose, he discovered that, as a result of pervasive sex discrimination in legal
education and the legal profession, there were not many qualified women
from which to choose. This was particularly true on the Republican side.
So, as the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor
was more moderate than the typical Republican appointee. Indeed, her
Segal-Cover score made her the most moderate Republican appointee on
the Court, almost as close to Democrat-appointee Stephen Breyer as to her
closest Republican-appointed fellow justice, Anthony Kennedy.
There is a third model of judicial decision-making that political scientists
have developed: the strategic actor model. It is most closely associated with
the work of Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. In The Choices Justices Make,
107 n 96 (255).
108 ibid 281.
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Epstein and Knight write that the 'strategic account of judicial decision
making comprises three main ideas: [l] justices' actions are directed toward
the attainment of goals, [2] justices are strategic and, [3] institutions structure
justices' interactions.'m In keeping with the attitudinal mode, Epstein and
Knight accept the premise that 'justices, first and foremost, wish to see their
policy preferences etched into law'. 112 In keeping with the public opinion/
institutional model, Epstein and Knight also accept the premise that courts
lack the power to implement their decisions and are heavily dependent
on the support of others. Where the strategic actor model differs from the
attitudinal model is in its second premise, that judges are constrained in
their ability to enact their policy preferences by their colleagues, the rules of
the court in which they serve and the lack of power of judicial institutions.
As they write, 'justices are strategic actors, who realize that their ability to
achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others,
of the choices they expect others to make, and of the institutional context
in which they act. 113 If a justice simply voted her sincere preferences, as
the attitudinal model predicts, she might be the sole dissenter in a case.
It takes a majority of judges on a court to set precedent. Thus, a strategic
judge will compromise, selecting the outcome closest to her preferred policy
position for which she can win a majority of her colleagues' votes. Similarly,
a judge may realise that her preferred policy position lacks support among
those political actors, interest groups, administrators, and the public whose
support is essential for the decision to be implemented. Once again, the
strategic actor model predicts that a judge will compromise her position to
select the outcome closest to her preferred policy position that is most likely
to be implemented.
In practice, there is a good deal of evidence supporting the strategic actor
model. To explore the plausibility of the model, the authors focused on
the 157 cases that were orally argued in the US Supreme Court's 1983 term
and that were listed in Justice Brennan's register. 114 They also examined
the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and Powell. In
addition, they undertook similar investigation of 125 landmark opinions
issued by the Supreme Court over the Court's 1969-1985 terms. Much of
what they found supported the premise that justices acted strategically so as
to build majorities for their preferred policy positions.
111
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Among the findings was evidence that the justices were aware of the views of
political elites, interest groups and public. For example, in the justices' files,
they found newspaper editorials and stories about current and past cases.U 5
They found that in most cases, at least one brief provided this information. 116
Further, more than three-fourths of briefs indicated the views of the other
branches of government. 117 And, in more than half the cases at the justices'
conference, at least one Justice mentioned the position of other branches of
government.118
The strategic actor model finds support in the Grutter decision. While the
attitudinal model might have predicted that the University of Michigan's
plan would be invalidated, the strategic actor model looks to factors other
than the justices' policy preferences. Eighty-four amicus briefs were filed
in the case. Sixty-nine of them supported the University and its affirmative
action plan, eleven supported Grutter and four supported neither party. 119
Among the briefs supporting affirmative action were ones from 13,922
current law students, twenty-eight of the leading liberal arts colleges in the
country, most of the Ivy League colleges and universities and several other
leading universities, such as the University of Chicago, Stanford, and MIT.
Importantly there was a brief filed by sixty-five Fortune 500 companies in
support of affirmative action. The General Motors Corporation filed a brief
in support of affirmative action, as did DuPont and IBM. Also importantly,
twenty-nine retired military leaders, including former high-ranking officers
and civilian leaders of all branches of the US military, Secretaries of Defense,
and present and former members of the US Senate who had military careers
filed a brief in support of affirmative action.
These briefs, representing leaders in higher education, business, and the
military could have sent a powerful signal to the Court about their support
for affirmative action. The justices might have concluded that a decision
invalidating all affirmative action would fly in the face of the practices of
leading US universities, corporations, and military leaders, practices said
to be vital to their mission and effectiveness. This is more than conjecture.
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ibid 145.
ibid 145-47.
ibid 147, Table 5-1.
ibid 149.
List of the briefs and a summary of each of them, available at http://www.vpcomm.untich.edu/
admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/summary.html. Link to each of the briefs supporting the
University, available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/adntissions/legaJ/gru_amicus-ussc/
um.html.
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Writing for the Court in the Grutter decision, Justice O'Connor took note of
these briefs:
'major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.
Brief for 3M, et al. as Amici Curiae 5; Brief for General Motors Corp.
as Amicus Curiae 3-4. What is more, high-ranking retired officers
and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, '[b]ased
on [their] decades of experience; a 'highly qualified, racially diverse
officer corps .. .is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle
mission to provide national security.' Brief for Julius W Becton, Jr., et
al. as Amici Curiae 5. 120
While supporters of the attitudinal model would likely suggest that Justice
O'Connor used these briefs to support and further her policy preferences,
her citations of them are at the very least compatible with the strategic actor
model of judicial decision-making.
VII. THE POST-UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES

In 2007 the Supreme Court heard yet another affirmative action case dealing
with education, this time for elementary and high school students. In Parents
Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District No. 1,m the Court
heard constitutional challenges to 'voluntarily adopted student assignment
plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children
may attend 122 in Seattle. Washington and Jefferson County (Louisville),
Kentucky. The idea behind the plans was to maintain racial integration in
the public schools and to prevent some of them from becoming all white or
all minority. In particular, Seattle was concerned that without such a plan,
minority students concentrated in low-income, minority neighbourhoods
would lack access to the best schools. 123 These plans were challenged by
Parents Involved in Community Schools, a non-profit group that supported
neighbourhood schools. As Chief Justice Roberts explained, the suits
were brought by '[p]arents of students denied assignment to particular
schools under these plans solely because of their race ...contending that
allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race violated
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.' 124 In operation,
120 cf Grutter (n 97) 330-31.
121 cf Adarand (n 79).
122 ibid 709-10.
123 ibid 712.
124 ibid 710-11.
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both plans had minimal effects, involving 307 students in Seattle 125 and
approximately 3% of school children in Jefferson County. 126
The Supreme Court invalidated both plans. Writing for only a plurality of the
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the diversity rationale of Grutter,
holding that it was 'unique to institutions of higher education'. 127 He found
that the governmental interest in both cases was 'racial balance' which was
not compelling under the strict scrutiny standard of the 14th Amendment.
'In design and operation; Roberts wrote, 'the plans are directed only to racial
balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned
as illegitimate. 128 Further in his opinion, he noted that at the 'heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that
the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not simply as components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class'. 129 To support this position,
the Chief Justice looked back to the Brown decision, arguing it stood for
the proposition that school children could not, constitutionally, be treated
differently on the basis of race. Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 'the position
of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have
been clearer: [T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according
differential treatment to American children on the basis of their colour
or race.' 130 He then quoted Robert Carter, one of the plaintiff's lawyers in
Brown, who, in oral argument, had told the Court that his 'one fundamental
contention [was] that no State has any authority under the equal-protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording
educational opportunities among its citizens.131
The fifth vote for invalidating both affirmative action plans came from
Justice Kennedy. Unlike the plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy stressed
the reality of racial discrimination and unequal opportunities. 'The
enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often
it does; he wrote. 132 In his view, the plurality opinion was 'too dismissive
of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal
opportunity regardless of their race.' 133 This meant for Justice Kennedy
that a colour-blind Constitution in 'the real world ...cannot be a universal
125
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ibid 733.
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ibid 724.
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ibid 730.
ibid 747.
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ibid 787.
ibid 787-88.
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constitutional principle.' 134 'Diversity,' Justice Kennedy wrote, can be 'a
compelling educational goal a school district may pursue'. 135
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, however, because he thought that
neither Seattle, nor Jefferson County had met its heavy burden under the strict
scrutiny standard of 'justifying its use of individual racial classifications'. 136
But, this did not mean that race could never be used by school officials. 'In
the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities,' wrote
the Justice, 'it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and
to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect
of which is its racial composition.' 137 The problem in these cases was the
way in which it was done. A 'more nuanced, individual evaluation of school
needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component,' 138
Justice Kennedy wrote, 'could be constitutional'.
The four dissenting justices were incensed at the way in which the Chief
Justice used the Brown decision to argue against affirmative action. The
context of Brown was that state and local officials used race to demean and
stigmatise African-American school children, separating them from white
children. The aim of the Brown decision was to help African-Americans to
end their demeaning treatment. Justice Stevens called it a 'cruel irony' 139 to
turn Brown on its head and use its argument to stop voluntary efforts to
provide equal opportunity to all students. As Justice Stevens pointed out,
Chief Justice Roberts 'fail[ed] to note that it was only black schoolchildren'
who were unable to attend local schools. '[l]ndeed,' Justice Stevens wrote,
'The history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend
black schools'. 14° For Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice's opinion 'rewrites
the history of one of this Court's most important decisions.' 141 Justice Breyer
agreed, calling it a 'cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka, Kansas, in
the 1950's to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day-to equate the plight
of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the
circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school
closer to home was initially declined).' 142
134
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To explain the decision in Parents Involved, one need not look much further
than the attitudinal model. The five justices who voted to invalidate the
affirmative action plans were all appointed by Republican Presidents. Both
Democrat appointees, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented with the
support of the two moderate Republican appointees, Justices Stevens and
Souter. Since the Michigan decisions in 2003, two new Justices had joined
the Court. Chief Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist who died,
and Justice Alito replaced Justice O'Connor who retired. Ideologically, the
Roberts for Rehnquist replacement was a wash; the Alito for O'Connor was
a conservative move. The Court that heard Parents Involved was a more
conservative body than the Court that heard the Michigan affirmative action
cases.
In the wake of Parents Involved, it appeared that the constitutionality
of affirmative action programmes hung by a thread. Now, at least four
justices even believed that Brown v Board of Education should be read to
outlaw affirmative action. Many people thought its future depended on
the identity of the next President and of the next justice to leave the Court,
either through retirement or death. If a Democrat President was elected
in 2008 and one of the five most conservative justices left the Court, the
President would almost certainly appoint a Justice who would uphold the
constitutionality of affirmative action. On the other hand, if a Republican
was elected, and one of the four more liberal justices left the Court, it was
thought that all affirmative action plans would be invalidated. In the 2008
Presidential election, the Democrats' candidate, Senator Barack Obama was
elected President. However, the two justices who retired, Justices Souter
and Stevens, came from the liberal wing of the Court. Their replacements,
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, would presumably vote the same way, leaving
the Court's views of affirmative action unchanged.
On June 24, 2013, the US Supreme Court announced its decision in yet
another affirmative action case involving the University of Texas. Fisher
v The University of Texas143 was a case brought by a white woman, Abigail
Fisher, who had been denied admission to the University of Texas. The
University, in order to produce a 'critical mass' of minority students over
and above the numbers produced by the Top Ten Percent Plan, took race
into account in its admission factors. Following the Supreme Court's holding
in Grutter, the University treated race as one factor among many in its

143

cf Fisher (n 4).
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admission decisions. As Justice Kennedy wrote, the University used race as
a 'meaningful factor' 144
in its admission decisions. Fisher challenged this use of race as denying her
the equal protection of the laws. The University's affirmative action plan
was upheld in the lower courts. Fisher appealed to the US Supreme Court.
In predicting how the Court would decide the issue, all eyes were on Justice
Kennedy. If he were to vote with his four other Republican-appointed
colleagues-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alitothen it was widely believed affirmative action in universities would be
ended. Ifhe were to vote with his Democrat-appointed colleagues who heard
the case 145 -Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor-then it was widely
believed affirmative action would survive, at least for the time being. And, it
was hard to know what Justice Kennedy would do. On the one hand, he had
dissented in the Grutter case which upheld the use of race as one factor in
admission decisions. On the other hand, his concurrence in the more recent
Parents Involved case suggested he might be open to a narrowly tailored and
carefully structured affirmative action programme.
Justice Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion. His opinion was joined by all
of his colleagues except for Justice Ginsburg. The Court found that the
lower courts had not correctly applied the strict scrutiny standard. Under
the Constitution and the Court's precedents, Justice Kennedy wrote, 'strict
scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating,
before turning to racial classifications, that available workable raceneutral alternatives do not suffice'. 146 In considering the constitutionality
of the affirmative action plan, the Court held that the lower courts had not
subjected the University's plan to this searching inquiry. 'The District Court
and Court of Appeals confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a
way,' Justice Kennedy wrote, 'by deferring to the University's good faith in
its use of racial classifications ....' 147 Thus, the case was vacated and remanded
to the Court of Appeals to apply the correct constitutional standard. 148
144 ibid.
145 The ninth Justice on the Supreme Court, Justice Kagan, appointed by Democratic President
Barack Obama, recused herself.
146 cf Fisher (n 4).
147 ibid.
148 The US Court of Appeals for the S"' Circuit held oral argument in Fisher on 13 November
2013. As of the date of this publication, it had not delivered its opinion. For coverage of
the oral argument, see, Manny Fernandez, 'Texas University's Race Admissions Policy is
Debated Before a Federal Court' New York Times (14 November 2013) <http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/14/us/texas-universitys-race-admissions-policy-is-debated-before-a-federal-court.
html?emc=ediL20131114&tnemail0=y>
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The Fisher decision left the constitutionality of affirmative action unsettled.
Why did the Court do this? One plausible explanation, of course, is that it
was the correct legal decision. If a lower court misapplies current doctrine,
it is procedurally defensible to remand the case and order the lower court
to re-examine the issue. But, this seems too easy. The Court wasn't required
to hear the case. Typically, the Court accepts a case for review if there is a
conflict among US Courts of Appeals. That was not the case here. Another
ground for the Court to take a case is if the lower courts reject Court
precedent or make a major departure from current practice. Again, that was
not the case here. Under Court rules, it takes the votes of four justices for
the Court to accept a case. This suggests that the four conservative justices
voted to hear the case thinking they could win the vote of Justice Kennedy
and produce a Court opinion invalidating affirmative action once and for all.
If so, it appears they miscalculated. It may be the case that Justice Kennedy
wasn't yet prepared to invalidate all use of race in university admissions. If
he had been willing, it seems virtually certain he would have been joined by
his other Republican-appointed colleagues.
Another interesting question raised by the decision is why Justices Breyer
and Sotomayor, two Democrat-appointed justices who had voted to uphold
affirmative action plans in the past,149 joined the Court's opinion and not
Justice Ginsburg's dissent? One possible answer comes from the strategic
actor model. If, as suggested above, they believed that the future of
affirmative action depended on Justice Kennedy's vote, then perhaps they
were willing to support him doing anything short of striking it down. They
may have believed that a remand was the best outcome they could hope for.
Further, the remand buys time. Perhaps one of the Republican-appointed
justices will leave the Court before the next affirmative action case reaches
it?150 If that were to happen, and a Democrat was President, then there would
very likely be live votes to uphold affirmative action.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The US Supreme Court is a political institution. Its members are selected
and appointed through a partisan political process. In contentious political
issues, it is presented with the ambiguous words of the US Constitution.
Through amicus briefs, it learns the policy preferences of those individuals,
149 Justice Breyer concurred in the Gratz decision which invalidated the automatic point system used
in undergraduate admissions at the University of Michigan. The facts of the Fisher cases, however,
were much more similar to the use of race in Grutter, which Justice Breyer supported.
150 Justices Scalia and Kennedy will both turn 78 in 2014.
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institutions, and organisations whose support is crucial if the Court's
decisions are to be given more than lip service. Given this reality, it is naive
to expect the justices to be entirely removed from the society in which
they live and the political system of which they are members. Perhaps, in
no substantive area is this truer than in issues of discrimination, including
affirmative action.
In examining how the Supreme Court reaches its decisions in affirmative
action cases, I have argued that three leading models of judicial decisionmaking, the attitudinal model, the strategic actor model and the institutional/
public opinion model shed a great deal oflight. They highlight how the policy
preferences of the justices, the constraints under which they operate, and
the beliefs of white elites and the white public more generally are powerful
predictors of how cases will be decided. If this is right, then the future of
affirmative action depends much more on politics and elections than it does
on constitutional provisions, precedents and legal interpretation. The future
of affirmative action, then, largely depends on which party wins the 2016 US
Presidential election. That outcome, and not any legal argument, must be
the focus of anyone who wishes to understand the development of the US
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in affirmative action and, perhaps, in other
contentious areas.
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